Architectural Digest for International Trade and Labor Law:
Regional Free Trade Agreements and
Minimum Criteria for Enforceable Social Clauses
By Marley S. Weiss*§
In the past decade and a half, the negotiation of free trade agreements (FTAs) has
dramatically increased. The number of party states and the range of level of development
among party countries have expanded drastically. At the same time, the subject matter
scope of these treaties has grown by leaps and bounds. Agreements are no longer limited
to trade in goods, but increasingly cover trans-national provision of services and crossborder mobility of investment capital. Bilateral agreements are proliferating at an
astounding pace, but even more significant are the agreements, much smaller in number,
involving three or more countries. At the global level, the World Trade Organization
(WTO), whose predecessor body began with a mandate limited to trade in goods, has
now expanded into trade in services, as well as intellectual property, with frustrated
efforts to add elements addressing investment and government procurement. Plurilateral
agreements, such as the treaties establishing the European Union (EU), the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the proposed Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), combine more extensive coverage of goods, services, and capital, and
constitute regional integration agreements.
Separate from these types of trade-related agreements, there are international
labor rights instruments binding many of the same countries, under the auspices of the
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International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations, and regional international
organizations such as the Council of Europe and the Organization of American States.
Many countries also incorporate the right to form trade unions, the right to strike, the
right to non-discrimination in employment and remuneration, and other internationallyguaranteed worker rights in their domestic constitutions as fundamental rights.1 There
has been a nearly complete disconnect until recently, however, between the deepening
body of international trade regulation and the corpus of international and domestic
worker rights commitments.
In regional integration treaties, this trend is changing rapidly. The EU, which,
from its inception, has included a narrow band of worker rights within its treaties, has
greatly expanded its competence in the fields of labor, employment and social policy.
(Barnard 2000:ch 1; Bercusson 2001) The U.S. has moved from labor and environmental
side agreements in NAFTA in the early 1990s, to placing labor and environmental
matters in the main body of its bilateral FTAs negotiated with Jordan, Chile and
Singapore at the start of the new century, to the 2002 adoption of “fast track” trade
promotion authority legislation, mandating inclusion of a range of labor and other social
provisions in the text of future FTAs as a condition of an up or down vote, without
opportunity for amendment of the terms of the agreement, in the United States Congress
(Weiss 2003). Labor rights provisions have been included in subsequently negotiated
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FTAs between the U.S. and Australia, and in somewhat weakened form, in the
Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).
The labor rights, or “social clause” is a compromise between the views of
advocates and opponents of freer trade. It is a treaty term, contractually binding the
nation-state parties to the FTA not to use downward competition in domesticallyregulated terms of employment as a means to attract and retain capital investment. For
more developed countries, it operates as a circuit-breaker to disrupt and preclude interstate bidding wars offering reduction in labor protections as a means of gaining or
retaining investment and jobs. It also obligates party nation-states to improve to
internationally-set minimum labor criteria when the state’s regulatory starting point falls
below that level. As the scope of FTAs expands from privately purchased goods to
services, intellectual property, investment, government procurement, and beyond, the
potential impact upon workers, their collective representation organs, and domestic
government regulation of their conditions of work increases exponentially. This
heightens the persuasive force of demands of free market skeptics that strong social
clauses be incorporated in regional integration agreements.
The social clause also is a policy response to supporters of market forces,
requiring them to put their money behind their theoretical assertions. Opposition to
inclusion of a social clause in the text of FTAs has come primarily from advocates of a
pure free market approach (e.g., Bhagwati 2002; Irwin 2002). Opposition also has come
from some lesser-developed country advocates who regard labor constraints as
“protectionist,” depriving poorer countries of potential comparative advantage (e.g.,
Bhagwati 2004:47; Sukthankor and Nova 2004:230). If market forces in fact produce a
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rising tide lifting all boats, the social clause will be superfluous, since it merely mandates
what the market will accomplish on its own. If free market believers are wrong, the
social clause will mitigate the adverse consequences for workers flowing from the move
to more internationally-open markets.
It is important at this historical juncture to evaluate these instruments realistically,
and with an eye to the optimization of their design. No matter how strong the substantive
provisions of the social clause, if the structure of the treaty will render it unenforceable as
a practical matter, those relying on it to moderate the effects of intensified free trade will
find that they have been deluded, and deprived of the benefit of their political bargain.
The Social Clauses in Regional Integration Agreements
One can contrast the simple trade agreement of old with the more elaborate
modern agreements. The simple FTA reduced existing national barriers to trade in goods
between the party countries. It had little implementation and enforcement machinery
apart from the trade ministries of the party countries.
The idea behind the original European Economic Community was always broader
than this. Some proposed, from the outset, gradual creation of a federal European state,
although the founding Treaty of Rome of 1957 fell far short of this. By the adoption of
the Single European Act in 1986, Europe had embraced the “four freedoms:” free
movement of goods, services, capital and workers, among the party countries (Barnard
2000). These four types of free movement provide a benchmark for the substantive range
of other FTAs. Until the 1990s, most other international agreements limited themselves
to free trade in goods, although a growing number separately addressed investment.
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NAFTA combined free movement of goods, services, and investment within a single,
unified agreement, although importantly, it excluded movement of workers (Weiss 2003).
The European Community (EC), as it eventually renamed itself, from the outset
was divided over the extent to which it should depend purely on the growing internal
market to yield upward harmonization of labor standards among the diverse Member
States. The Treaty of Rome provided for a few areas of European level labor law-related
competence, particularly equal pay for women and men. The European supranational
structure has both deepened and widened through successive treaty iterations. It has
become more and more like a con-federal, if not federal, state in the fields in which it has
authority to act. It has established a set of executive, regulatory, and legislative
institutions akin to a permanent government, although their largely inter-governmental
nature has left them continually looking like the proverbial body established by
committee. As the EC has morphed into the EU, it progressively has expanded its
competence over the field of labor and social policy (Barnard 2000; Bercusson 2001).
A growing volume of EU directives has been adopted setting minimum standards
or objectives for national legislation, most recently including workers’ participation in
workplace governance and in strategic corporate decisionmaking for companies operating
in multiple EU countries. Nevertheless, through the present, the EU has left to Member
States the regulation of many aspects of collective interest representation, has declined to
regulate collective bargaining at the European level, and has refused to set standards for
the use of economic weaponry such as the strike or lockout (Barnard 2000; Hepple 2002).
Substantively, the EU has moved constantly forward in expanding the scope of its
authority over labor law and policy, although the form of its regulatory activity has been
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changing. In addition, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and
resulting amendments to the treaties, have provided the workers themselves with the
ability to seek remedies for violations of their EU-level rights, either against their
employer, or against their home country for failing effectively to implement the EU
legislation (Ward 2000). This has greatly bolstered the rate of full implementation of
EU-established rights. It has, however, had the collateral consequence of reducing
Member State enthusiasm for establishing additional rights which may be asserted by
private individuals. It also has contributed to the adoption of a new mode of EU
regulation which lacks the usual aspects of enforceability: the open method of
coordination (OMC), regarding both fiscal and employment policy of the Member States.
The OMC is lauded by some as a more flexible mechanism for shared governance in an
EU now expanded to 25 Member States. However, it is deplored by others, including EU
trade unions, as disempowering Member States, further reducing their sovereign control
over social policy, while exacerbating the democratic deficit within the EU and reducing
the ability of trade unions and other citizen representatives effectively to influence
policymaking (e.g., Trubek and Trubek, 2005).
We may contrast these European developments with the nearly total formal
retention of nation-state sovereignty in NAFTA and subsequent U.S. FTAs. The fight
over inclusion of labor provisions in each of these agreements has been a bitter one. In
NAFTA, it resulted in a labor side agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (NAALC), while the major advance in the U.S.-Jordan and later trade
agreements was inclusion of the labor provisions within the core agreement (Weiss
2003).
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The U.S. hit the high water mark in scope of substantive coverage when it
negotiated eleven labor principles into NAFTA: (1) the right to organize; (2) the right to
bargain collectively; (3) the right to strike; (4) the prohibition of forced labor; (5) labor
protections for children and young persons; (6) assurance of minimum labor standards;
(7) elimination of employment discrimination; (8) equal pay for women and men; (9)
prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses; (10) compensation in cases of
occupational illnesses and injuries; and (11) protection of migrant workers. Later U.S.
trade agreements covered fewer labor principles, but provided somewhat stronger
protections for those principles they did include. At the same time, however, they
excluded coverage of U.S. state labor law, limiting U.S. commitments to those pertaining
to federal law, even though there is overlapping state and federal legislative authority on
nearly all labor-related matters except private sector union organizing and collective
bargaining (Weiss 2003).
On the other hand, the later FTAs importantly exceed the NAALC in the strength
of the commitments undertaken. In the NAALC, the major binding obligation was that
each of the three countries would effectively enforce their own domestic labor laws, but
Party governments retained full freedom to modify those laws. In the U.S.-Jordan
agreement, for the first time, the standards of the ILO Constitution and Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work were incorporated as benchmarks, with a
commitment to “strive to ensure” that domestic labor laws satisfied those international
obligations, and were not watered down as a means to compete for investment. However,
the ILO Declaration, hence the internationally-set minimum standard for domestic law,
covers only four areas: freedom of association, including the right to organize and to
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bargain collectively, elimination of forced labor, elimination of child labor, and
elimination of discrimination in the workplace. As a result of requirements contained in
the 2002 fast track trade promotion authorization legislation, similar language
benchmarking international labor norms has been included in subsequent FTAs.
Nevertheless, although these commitments are technically binding, they are weak. The
commitments to satisfy ILO obligations and not to derogate from domestic labor law to
attract foreign trade or investment from other Parties continue to be prefaced by “strive to
ensure,” and are not covered by the enforcement provisions of the trade agreements.
The post-NAFTA FTAs all, however, contain NAALC-like promises to
“effectively enforce domestic labor law;” these commitments are stronger than those
provided in the NAALC in that they are subject to the same trade agreement dispute
resolution provisions applicable to the commitments regarding trade in goods and
services. This is usually touted as “equivalent” or “parity of” enforceability. The
“parity” claim is a bit misleading, since the private right of action remedies for investors
under the investment chapter of these agreements are far stronger. Moreover, in DRCAFTA, a monetary assessment is substituted for trade sanctions as the primary remedy,
and the money is used to fund labor rights development programs by the offending
government within the offending country. Finally, although expansion of free trade
treaties into services, investment, and government procurement may increasingly create
conflict with domestic labor law (as well as consumer, environmental, and other noncommercial law) obligations, the FTAs still do little to establish meaningful institutional
implementation mechanisms to preserve labor rights.
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To contain the seemingly inexorable trend toward deregulatory globalization, as
opposed to progressively upwards-harmonized labor law, we must go beyond rectifying
substantive omissions in the obligatory labor standards mandated for future trade
agreements. We also must crack the tough nut of devising an institutional framework
which could make effective implementation and enforcement of social clause
commitments a reality.
The Dilemma of Effective Schemes for Social Clause Implementation
Let me say a few words about why incorporation of labor provisions inside of
trade agreements is important, even though so many countries already are parties to
separate international labor commitments under ILO and UN auspices, and why it
matters, even if we cannot realistically promise full implementation. The social clause
ensures that the labor commitments have equal dignity and binding force with the trade
commitments, and pretermits investor claims that labor regulatory interference with their
unfettered business freedoms counts as the international equivalent of a regulatory taking.
Because an international tribunal usually has competence only over the treaty pursuant to
which it is acting, it is common for a tribunal to decline to take into account obligations
under other bodies of law. The result is that the trade treaty before the tribunal may
“trump” externally created labor rights. Inclusion of a social clause prevents a tribunal
interpreting the treaty’s free trade obligations from asserting that it need not take labor
obligations into consideration.
In addition, sanctions for violations of trade and investment provisions of trade
treaties are usually severe, while the remedies for stand-alone, ILO and UN-based
international labor convention violations traditionally have been largely hortatory (e.g.,
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Hepple 2002. It is true that inclusion of labor rights within the trade agreement does not
on its own produce equivalent enforcement, even when seemingly identical remedies are
written into the text. Inclusion, however, does prevent a government from having to risk
imposition of possibly severe trade sanctions in order to comply with its (nonsanctionable) international labor obligations.
These purposes served by inclusion of a social clause in a trade agreement are
sufficient to warrant insistence upon this as a condition of acceptance of trade
agreements. Much more, however, is necessary to fulfill the implicit political promise of
trade negotiators, that the social clause will accomplish its role as circuit breaker in the
threatened downward spiral of labor standards under pressure of free trade. For that, we
must rethink the institutional arrangements established in trade agreements.
Historically, under public international law, treaties in many ways have
functioned like contracts between nations, even when the terms they established were
intended to benefit or regulate party country-resident individuals or businesses. Only
governments negotiated treaties and only governments could administer and enforce
them. For lawyers and legal scholars, a useful metaphor is to characterize the citizen or
business as a third party beneficiary of the treaty. The domestic actor had no rights
regarding what terms would be negotiated into the treaty, except in terms of domestic
political processes and constitutional rights. The domestic actor, like the third party
beneficiary in nineteenth century common law contract cases, had dubious enforcement
rights except to the extent that she or he could persuade the contractual party, the
government, to intervene and exercise its rights on the beneficiary’s behalf.
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For industrial relations specialists, an alternative metaphor is the U.S. labor
union’s status as exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees in the
bargaining unit. For the employee to vindicate a claim that the employer has breached
the worker’s rights under a collective bargaining agreement, the employee must file a
grievance, over which the union will have nearly exclusive control throughout the labor
contract dispute resolution procedure. Nation-state sovereignty traditionally has kept
domestic law insulated from external regulation in a fashion similar to the U.S. labor law
notion of the union’s status as exclusive collective bargaining agent.2
In a traditional international treaty, domestic actors whose interests have been
injured by treaty violations have recourse only by seeking diplomatic intercession by
their home country. It remains up to their government to determine whether and how
vigorously to press a claim of breach of treaty obligation. Unless the treaty itself sets up
enforcement machinery, or the country parties have by separate action subjected
themselves to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, there are only three
options for one country to seek to remedy the breach of another. (1) The enforcing
country can negotiate, that is, inform the breaching country of its claim of violation and
demand redress. (2) The enforcing country can withdraw totally from the treaty. (3) The
enforcing country unilaterally can impose proportionate, countervailing measures to
offset its losses caused by the breach of the other country. Negotiation, of course, is
meaningful largely because of the threat either of withdrawal or of unilaterally imposed
sanctions, or because of threats pertaining to collateral aspects of international relations
between the countries. Although in some areas, particularly international human rights,
2

The exclusive bargaining representation metaphor is the subject of more extended treatment in my work
in progress, “Exclusive Bargaining Representation: Parallels Between the Roles of Trade Unions in U.S.
Collective Labor Law, and the Nation-State in International Law.”

12

international treaties have moved to a more pluralistic model, U.S.-negotiated FTAs have
remained designed predominantly on the traditional pattern, with the exception of their
investor-protection provisions.
The problem of a means to induce governments to comply with their labor
obligations is the flaw which threatens to render hollow the political bargain, in which the
social clause is accepted as quid pro quo for trade liberalization. In the international
human rights area, there is much enthusiasm for “naming and shaming,” for international,
independent monitoring of each party government’s compliance with its treaty
obligations, but with voluntary compliance and domestic and international political
repercussions as the only enforcement mechanism in the event of violation. In the labor
rights area, with the contending economic as well as political interests at stake, long
experience demonstrates that stronger remedies are needed; one need only look at the rate
of non-observance of core ILO conventions by countries which have ratified them.
The government failing to enforce its laws, or watering them down to attract or
retain job-providing foreign investment, victimizes the workers of their own country,
whose confidence in domestic law enforcement is likely to be nonexistent, and who have
no FTA claim against their home government. Foreign competitors and their employees
are competitively disadvantaged by the breach of labor obligations, yet under these trade
agreements they have no private ability to institute action. They may seek enforcement
intervention by their own government, but it is likely to pursue the matter only if there
are extraneous reasons to do so.3
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International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. (Danchin 2002:58-63)
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Moreover, diplomatic representation is of dubious value for several reasons.
First, as the U.S. FTAs state, in the dispute resolution process, the primary means is
consultations with a view to gaining voluntary compliance. In light of the strong domestic
political and economic interests underlying the typical breach of party country labor
obligations, this voluntary mechanism is doomed to fail. Second, diplomacy involves far
too many trade-offs for the risk of further enforcement to serve as an effective motivator
to a developing country not to breach its labor obligations under pressure from would-be
foreign investors or from multinationals threatening to relocate to another country.
Third, this remedial approach was originally designed to address party
government violations in legislation addressing goods crossing the country’s border.
Customs rules, tariffs, and discriminatory imposts, for the most part are easily definable
and measurable, and involve a regulatory matter whose effective implementation is
within the government’s own control. Labor matters, however, are more complicated.
Although the obligation is that of the government, expressed in terms of formal
regulation and its formal and informal implementation, the goal is to alter the behavior of
employers, in the private as well as public, the informal as well as the formal sector. This
additional articulated joint in the transmission of the international norm into actual
application for the intended beneficiaries, the workers, plays havoc with easy
measurement of party-state compliance with its obligations once one goes beyond mere
facial transposition of the international norm into domestic law.
In addition, there is good reason to be cautious about international tribunals,
particularly those whose main concern is with tariffs, customs duties and similar more
traditional commercial trade issues. These may well be inherently biased fora for
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interpreting labor rights which operate in contradistinction to other deregulatory aspects
of the trade agreement. Moreover, using an equivalent remedy to address violations of
provisions regarding labor, the environment, and trade in goods or services may be to
treat alike things which are unlike, yielding a remedy formally the same but in practice
very different in its deterrent effect against further violations. Thus, although a neutral
tribunal is needed to develop a coherent and consistent interpretation of future trade-labor
treaties, it runs the risk of further erosion of state sovereignty, and further undermining
democratic input into economic and social policy-making. More thought about
appropriate, innovative institutional design is required if the problem of a suitable
institutional architecture for truly enforceable labor rights is to be solved.
The underlying fundamental problem with U.S.-signatory FTAs is that both in
negotiating and in implementing the FTA, each party government is aggregating
preferences among a host of domestic constituents, and these types of international
obligations are to a great extent both third party beneficiary agreements, and third party
burden agreements. Domestic actors benefiting from their own or another government’s
breach are exposed to no legal responsibility on the international plane. Employers
whose home government and courts look aside when businesses fire union activists or
pay sub-minimum wages bear no international law obligations or penalties under these
trade agreements. Domestic actors injured by another government’s breach – be they
foreign competitors, workers, or trade unions – have little recourse against the other
country, little clout to induce their home government to press their cause, and no avenue
of recourse against the real beneficiaries of the other government’s breach, which may
well be multinational corporations based in their own home country. Those harmed may
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likewise lack meaningful avenues of redress even against their own government’s breach
of social clause obligations, depending on the reality and effectiveness of the rule of law
in their domestic regime.
In the EU, the European Commission has some highly useful enforcement
powers, particularly when a government has failed to fulfill its obligation appropriately to
transpose European law into domestic legislation. In addition, individuals foster
enforcement by filing cases in domestic courts, which may lead the home country courts
to apply EU law, or if the law is unsettled, to refer the legal question to the ECJ. That is,
the domestic courts have been drafted into implementation of European law, despite their
limited role in its interpretation, and workers function to a modest degree like private
attorneys general in vindicating their own labor rights under European law (Alter 2001;
Ward 2000). Of course, Europe aspires to be a supranational state, an aspiration
disavowed thus far in other regional integration schemes.
Even if U.S. FTAs provided for a private ability to commence international
enforcement proceedings, the costs of doing so would be prohibitive for most workers,
small businesses, and trade unions, and the linguistic and organizational obstacles, as we
have seen from the NAALC experience (e.g., Weiss 2003), would be daunting. These
FTAs establish no European Commission-type institution to investigate and prosecute
systemic violations, no international agency is charged with the duty to ensure uniform
implementation of the international obligations, nor is there a standing tribunal like the
ECJ, to develop a consistent body of treaty interpretation. Of course, were there such
treaty organs, issues of adequate funding and independence from government and
multinational corporate interests also would have to be addressed. Some variation of an
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independent enforcement framework, as well as a private right to initiate proceedings
appears necessary if the “social clause for free trade” bargain is not to be illusory.
A separate cautionary note is the problem of government reaction if one creates a
private right of action with strong remedies. The EU shift toward the “Open Method of
Coordination,” a collective benchmarking, mutually-set and monitored goals and
timetable exercise devoid of legal enforceability, may be understood in part as an EU
Member State backlash against undue liability exposure and domestic political
embarrassment resulting from ECJ rulings making truly effective the promise of
“effective enforcement” of EU-created citizens’ rights. The U.S. and Canadian retreat
from strong investor rights to sue and recover damages for regulatory “expropriation”
provides another example.
Governments are loath to relinquish real control over interpretation and
implementation of international instruments, a reluctance directly proportionate to the
domestic political volatility of the consequences. Labor rights are among the most
politically-divisive and hard-fought issues. The irony of the FTA labor rights
commitments is that as presently constituted, they are a form of false advertising; they do
not meet minimum criteria for effective enforcement.
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